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Improving the environmental performance of non-domestic buildings is a complex and ‘wicked’ problem due to
conflicting interests and incentives. This is particularly challenging in tenanted spaces, where landlord and tenant
interactions are regulated through leases that traditionally ignore environmental considerations. ‘Green leasing’ is
conceptualized as a form of ‘middle-out’ inter-organizational environmental governance that operates between
organizations, alongside other drivers. This paper investigates how leases are evolving to become ‘greener’ in the UK
and Australia, providing evidence from five varied sources on: (1) UK office and retail leases, (2) UK retail sector
energy management, (3) a major UK retailer case study; (4) office leasing in Sydney, and (5) expert interviews on
Australian retail leases. With some exceptions, the evidence reveals an increasing trend towards green leases in prime
offices in both countries, but not in retail or sub-prime offices. Generally introduced by landlords, adopted green
leases contain a variety of ambitions and levels of enforcement. As an evolving form of private–private
environmental governance, green leases form a valuable framework for further tenant–landlord cooperation within
properties and across portfolios. This increased cohesion could create new opportunities for polycentric governance,
particularly at the interface of cities and the property industry.
Keywords: energy performance, governance, green leases, landlord, management strategies, non-domestic buildings,
offices, retail, tenants
Introduction
It has been well understood for some decades that
energy use in existing buildings is a major source of
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, and that there is sig-
nificant potential for energy savings in retrofitting
existing buildings (Levine et al., 2007; U¨rge-Vorsatz
et al., 2012). Reductions in emissions on the scale
required to stabilize the global climate cannot be
achieved without major change in the patterns of
energy use across the entire building stock. Although
change at this scale requires modifications in both tech-
nologies and organizational practices, research is
dominated by technological approaches (Lutzenhiser,
1993, 2014; Schweber & Leiringer, 2012), and
towards disciplines and activities that continue this tra-
jectory (Sovacool, 2014).Where social science research
does exist, it is skewed towards households (Deline,
2015; Dixon, Deline, McComas, Chambliss, & Hoff-
mann, 2015; Janda, 2014; Moezzi & Janda, 2014;
Taylor & Janda, 2015). Approximately 18% of UK
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GHG emissions come from energy use in non-domestic
buildings (CSE & ECI, 2012). By one estimate, this
rises to 34% if both operational and ‘capital’ GHG
emissions (direct and indirect emissions from construc-
tion works, services, materials, transport and products)
are included (Green Construction Board, 2013). Yet,
research in non-domestic buildings accounts for less
than 10% of the end-use energy demand research port-
folio in the UK (Hannon, Rhodes, & Skea, 2013;
LCICG, 2012). Broadening the understanding of the
socio-technical processes and constraints that affect
the dynamics of change in non-domestic buildings is
of critical national and global importance.
To bolster research in this area, in 2014 the UK Engin-
eering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC)
funded six new projects on energy management in non-
domestic buildings. This paper, and part of the research
included in it, is largely funded by one of these projects.
The project is called WICKED (Working with Infra-
structure, Creation of Knowledge, and Energy strategy
Development) and is designed to learn from real-world
situations, focusing on energy strategy development
in the retail sector. The acronym WICKED draws
on Rittel and Webber’s (1973) conceptualization of
complex problems that defy simplistic or straightfor-
ward planning responses as ‘wicked’, or tricky. Improv-
ing the building stock needs to address both the
technical challenges involved in upgrading the physical
infrastructure and also the social challenges of orga-
nizational decision-making (Biggart & Lutzenhiser,
2007). Where space is rented, the further challenge is
that these strategies need to work within, rather than
against or merely alongside, established systems of pro-
fessional and social practices (Levitt, Heinisz, Scott, &
Settle, 2010; Scott, Levitt, & Orr, 2011).
This paper focuses on the governance of rented space in
the non-domestic sector, which is a significant and
‘wicked’ problem. Of particular interest in this area
is the ‘split incentive’ problem between tenants and
landlords, where differing property interests and obli-
gations mean that neither party may have sufficient
incentive to invest in energy-efficiency upgrades or
engage in better energy management. Case studies
across both residential and non-residential contexts
in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) countries concluded that split
incentives affect up to 90% of the energy used in
many major markets (Prindle et al., 2007).
Leases serve a regulatory role in the governance of both
domestic and non-domestic rented space, and may con-
tribute to the split incentive problem. Once the content
is agreed between the parties, the lease terms constitute
the legal basis for resolution of any dispute and operate
as a kind of ‘local law’ binding on them. In this respect
the lease is a form of inter-organizational governance
for landlords and tenants, fleshing out their relationship
and setting practical norms for a specified length of
time. In non-domestic settings, the content and style
of the landlord–tenant relationship is heavily deter-
mined by institutional letting practices, which adopt
standardized structural patterns of leasing and lease
wording. These lease terms affect what changes can be
made to the premises (e.g., improvements) and set out
the obligations that parties owe to one another (e.g.,
in multi-unit properties the landlord’s duty to provide
maintenance and other services, and the tenant’s obli-
gation to pay a service charge towards the landlord’s
costs). Good environmental governance may require
collaboration between landlords and tenants, but stan-
dard leasing practices do not provide for, and may even
inhibit rather than promote, joint action. In particular,
leases do not ordinarily permit tenants to make struc-
tural alterations (e.g., energy upgrades) to the premises
or entitle landlords to recover the costs of improvements
to the tenant’s property (e.g., to install energy
upgrades). Leases seldom require the parties to share
energy data with one another, which can inhibit
energy management practices.
Recent developments in ‘green leases’ and, more
broadly, ‘green leasing’ seek to enable landlords and
tenants to meet environmental targets by changing
their organizational practices – through themechanism
of the lease – to work more cooperatively. ‘Green
leases’ are built on ‘green’ clauses within the lease
which are designed to account for energy efficiency and
other sustainability goals. Green leasing (also referred
to as ‘best practice’ or ‘performance’ leasing) refers to
the environmental processes, engagement and practices
adopted by landlords and tenants in relation to the
building. Together, these greener practices reflect a
change not only to the wording of the formal lease
document but also to the relationship between the
landlord and the tenant. Whereas traditional leasehold
relationships are frequently characterized as adver-
sarial, distant and distrustful, some greener leasing
practices attempt to foster better communication
between the parties. Interest in green leases and leasing
is growing, and articles on them have been published in
a number of countries in the last decade, including the
UK (Bright & Dixie, 2014; Hinnells et al., 2008;
Langley & Hopkinson, 2009), Australia (Roussac &
Bright, 2012; Woodford, 2007), Sweden (Lind, Bonde,
& Zalejska-Jonsson, 2014), Singapore (Chua, 2014),
the US (Kaplow, 2009; Oberle & Sloboda, 2010),
Canada (Sayce, Sundberg, Parnell, & Cowling, 2009),
and 20 countries across Europe (Duquesne, 2011).
This paper uses five case studies to investigate the evol-
ving role of ‘green leases’ in the environmental govern-
ance of tenanted non-domestic property in the UK and
Australia. The two countries were selected primarily
on the accessibility of evidence: green leases were first
adopted in Australia and the property markets in
both countries support Better Buildings Partnership
Janda et al.
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(BBP) organizations. These groups promote collabora-
tive efforts across the industry to enhance sustainabil-
ity, including, but not limited to, green leases. As
other papers in this special issue attest (Eisenberg,
2016; Rosenow, Fawcett, Eyre, & Oikonomou,
2016; van der Heijden, 2015 and forthcoming), most
building regulations are blind to the differences
between owner-occupied buildings and tenanted non-
domestic property: they are usually written from the
‘top-down’ by governments seeking to affect the
entire building stock. As this paper will discuss, green
leases are a relatively new form of environmental gov-
ernance negotiated from the ‘middle-out’ (Janda &
Parag, 2013; Parag & Janda, 2014) between landlords
and tenants at the property level.
The paper begins with a literature review that seeks
insight into the role of inter-organizational nego-
tiations at the property level. A methods section dis-
cusses the rationale for using a contextual case study
approach, drawing on expertise from industry associ-
ations in the UK and Australia, previous research and
new qualitative research. The next section provides a
context for five case studies, considering general prop-
erty markets, policy context and leasing practices in the
UK and Australia. The case studies illustrate whether
and how ‘green leases’ in the office and retail sectors
are becoming more commonplace, as well as the
typical forms these leases take. Further discussion
and analysis of these findings show that although
uptake is growing in both countries, green leases are
more commonly adopted in office properties than in
retail, and this uptake has been more comprehensively
quantified in the Australia than in the UK. As a tool for
inter-organizational environmental governance, green
leases are mainly implemented by large powerful land-
lords, with a few exceptions where they are driven by
powerful tenants. The concluding section draws
together wider implications for opportunities and chal-
lenges of green leasing as a tool for the environmental
governance of non-domestic buildings and proposes
directions for further research.
Context: corporations, inter-organizational
governance and property
This section reviews the literature for framing the role
of green leases as tools for non-domestic building gov-
ernance. The literature on corporate environmental
governance (CEG) and voluntary environmental pro-
grammes (VEPs) provides some guidance, but it also
has some gaps. To address more fully the role of
leases in tenanted property, the CEG and VEP concepts
are augmented with perspectives on ‘middle-out’
change (Janda & Parag, 2013; Parag & Janda,
2014), ‘building communities’ (Axon, Bright, Dixon,
Janda, & Kolokotroni, 2012), and strategic property
management (Edwards & Ellison, 2004).
Corporate environmental governance (CEG) and
voluntary environmental programmes (VEPs)
There is a broad literature on corporate social respon-
sibility that addresses various aspects of corporate
social, economic and environmental impacts (McWil-
liams, 2015). Focusing on environmental impacts,
specifically, a body of scholarship identifies various
factors involved in corporate governance of environ-
mental problems. This work normally focuses on
initiatives within firms or across firms of like-kind
(e.g., Borck & Coglianese, 2009; Gouldson & Sulli-
van, 2014; Howard-Grenville, Nash, & Coglianese,
2008; Prakash & Potoski, 2006). This literature
shows that an organization’s willingness to engage in
‘beyond compliance’ environmental programmes is
shaped by both external conditions (regulation, econ-
omic and social) and a range of internal, interacting
factors, including management style, organizational
culture and organizational structure. In their review
of the VEP literature, Borck and Coglianese (2009)
note three types of businesses are likely to participate
in VEPs: (1) larger businesses, as they have greater
resources to participate and may benefit most from rec-
ognition, (2) businesses with internal cultures suppor-
tive of environmentally friendly behaviour, and (3)
businesses that face (or are likely to face) stricter gov-
ernment regulations.
Insofar as green leasing can be considered as a particu-
lar form of VEP, this literature provides useful insights
into types of external and internal drivers for CEG.
However, this literature does not address inter-organ-
izational governance or property-level issues.
Inter-organizational governance:middle-out change
Inter-organizational activities, particularly between
dissimilar groups (e.g., landlords and tenants), are
often conceptualized as a space where ‘intermediaries’
serve an important role (Fischer & Guy, 2009; Moss,
2009; Moss, Medd, Guy, & Marvin, 2009). Janda
and Parag (2013) and Parag and Janda (2014)
augment this literature with new perspectives on
‘middle actors’, including designers, building pro-
fessionals and commercial real estate (property) com-
panies. Middle actors have their own agency and
capacity to foster innovation from the ‘middle out’
rather than merely reacting to policy push from the
top down or market pull from the bottom up. A
middle-out approach recognizes the influence of these
actors upstream (e.g., to policy-makers), downstream
(e.g., to customers and clients), and sideways (e.g., to
other middle actors).
The sideways element of a middle-out approach res-
onates with Vandenbergh’s (2005) attention to
private–private contracts, which he views as an impor-
tant contribution to the regulatory state. He uses the
language of ‘second-order regulatory agreements’ to
The evolution of green leases
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capture the idea that private–private agreements
respond to ‘first-order’ government regulatory require-
ments (e.g., standards, taxes and incentives), but also
forma new, durable and important formof governance.
This paper conceptualizes landlords and tenants as
middle actors in the property market who are able to
exert influence sideways through private–private con-
tracts, such as leases.
The role of property
Neither the general CEG literature nor the middle-out
perspective consider the role of property, which is criti-
cal to both leases and leasing practices. Axon et al.
(2012) outline an interdisciplinary ‘building commu-
nities’ approach to reducing energy use in tenanted
property. This approach highlights the importance of
three levels: (1) the general policy context, (2) the
role of organizations, and (3) the level of the building
itself, including the particular characteristics of both
the premises and the stakeholders. These authors call
for more research on the role of leases and their prac-
tical efficacy in effecting change. The current paper
contributes to this challenge.
Edwards and Ellison’s (2004) research on corporate
property management suggests that organizations
have varying perspectives on the importance of phys-
ical property relative to their core business. For some
corporates, the building is integral to their core
business strategy; for others, it is merely a container
in which work happens. For landlords and investors,
for example, the building is the business. Scholarship
focused on the property industry (e.g., Dixon, Ennis-
Reynolds, Roberts, & Sims, 2009; Newell, 2008)
identifies corporate social responsibility or responsible
property investment (UNEP FI, 2011) as a major driver
for these organizations. Tenants, however, may only
see the value of physical property as an operational
asset, not as a physical asset. These different perspec-
tives are at the heart of the tenant–landlord divide.
This paper considers whether green leasing can help
overcome this split incentive.
Methods
Evidencing change in leasing practices is difficult and
complex. The property market is global, but tenanted
buildings are located and operated in particular phys-
ical, social and political contexts, all of which can
affect leasing practices. Each tenanted unit has its
own lease, and multi-tenanted buildings have multiple
leases. Leases expire at the end of a fixed term, which
may be in one year or 99 years. Leases are treated as
commercially confidential, and in the UK public
records of the contents of agreed leases are not electro-
nically accessible or searchable. Additionally, there is
no internationally standardized method of classifying
leases as ‘green’.
To address this complex anddifficult to access topic, the
paper uses a case study approach (Yin, 2009) to draw
on a range of empirical evidence and situates these
cases within broader market and policy contexts.
Using case studies enables international and sectoral
comparison and facilitates a mix of methods, units of
analysis and case conceptions to capture the complexity
inherent in the development of greener leasing prac-
tices. As subsystems of practice may influence leasing
practices, five diverse cases and methods across
countries (UK and Australia), sectors (office and
retail), and organizations (landlords and tenants) facili-
tates further analysis of the landscape of leasing prac-
tices. By working across countries and cases, the aim
is to triangulate new research within a broader
context of existingwork to generate additional insights.
Table 1 summarizes the five case studies used, repre-
senting both office and retail sectors in Australia and
the UK. More detailed information on the methods
used in each study is included in subsequent sections.
The broader context in which these cases are situated
is considered below.
Case context
This section briefly reviews the complex and evolving
policy context, property markets and leasing practices
in the UK and Australia. The majority of non-domestic
property in these countries is rented: 56% in the UK
(Property Industry Alliance, 2014) and 70% in Austra-
lia (T. Crabb, Head of Research Savills, personal com-
munication, 2015).
TheUK context: propertymarket and regulatory
environment
The UK commercial property market is worth £683
billion, with London accounting for about 35% of
this market (Property Industry Alliance, 2014). The
Central London office market is a particularly impor-
tant sector, with a slight majority of Grade A quality
(offices of best quality specification, floor plate effi-
ciency and image; 55% or 307 000 m2) and with
Grade B/C accounting for just 45% (DTZ/Jones Lang
LaSalle, 2014, p. 8). Indeed, investment in central
London’s commercial property market reached £20.5
billion in 2014, marginally below the last investment
peak in 2007 when £20.6 billion was traded (Property-
Wire, 2015). Additional important markets include
Birmingham, Manchester, Leeds, Bristol, Edinburgh,
Cardiff and Glasgow (Bilfinger GVA, 2015).
UK building regulations set out specified energy effi-
ciency requirements for new commercial buildings as
Janda et al.
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well as renovations (DECC, 2014). In compliance with
the European Union’s Energy Efficiency Directive
(EP&C, 2012), the UK has a national energy efficiency
target to reduce energy consumption by 18% in 2020
relative to the 2007 business-as-usual projection, and
a target of 1.5% annual reduction between 2014 and
2020 (DECC, 2014). The Carbon Reduction Commit-
ment (CRC) Energy Efficiency Scheme requires compa-
nies that consume over 6000 MWh of electricity to
report and buy allowances for their CO2 emissions
(DECC, 2015a). In addition, under the new Energy
Saving Opportunities Scheme (ESOS), large organiz-
ations are required to carry out an energy audit every
four years, measuring and reporting energy use across
energy used in buildings, industrial processes and
transport (DECC, 2015b). Energy Performance Certifi-
cates (EPCs) rate properties based on age, size and
fabric of the building and are required when buildings
are constructed, let or sold (e.g., DECC, 2014). Display
Energy Certificates (DECs) rate properties based on
operational energy consumption and are currently
required only in public buildings (DECC, 2014).
From April 2018 minimum energy efficiency standards
(MEES) are being introduced, making it unlawful to let
properties that fail to achieve a prescribedMEES, set at
EPC rating E (DECC, 2015c). Of these regulations,
only MEES recognizes the importance of tenanted
commercial property.
In parallel, the voluntary sustainability rating system
‘BREEAM’ (Building Research Establishment Environ-
mental Assessment Methodology) provides a common
standard to enable the assessment and comparison of
the environmental impact of buildings. It has been
used to certify over 260 000 building assessments
across more than 50 countries (BRE, 2014). Under
BREEAM 2011, credits were available for green
leases, which incentivized owners seeking the highest
rating to negotiate green leases with occupiers.
Online commentaries suggest this was ‘unpopular’,
partly because tenants did not want to accept
additional obligations, and BREEAM 2014 has
removed the green lease credits (Parker, 2014).
TheAustralian context: propertymarket and
regulatory environment
The main property investment market in Australia is
worth about AU$280 billion (£130 billion) (Higgins,
2013). Sydney central business district (CBD), with
4.9 million m2 of total stock, is the largest office
market in Australia. Sydney is the primary location
for the head offices of most Australian companies; it
is also the most sought-after location, highlighted by
strong prime property rents and yields. The market is
currently comprised of 53% prime space (Premium
and A Grade) and 47% secondary grade space (B–D
Grades). Other major property markets in Australia
include Melbourne, Brisbane and Perth.
The Building Code of Australia Part J sets minimum
standards in respect of energy efficiency requirements
for new commercial buildings and for refurbishments
over a certain level of work (ABCB, 2010). However,
unlike the UK, where minimum energy standards
were introduced in the early 1980s, energy efficiency
only became part of the Australian Building Code in
2006. Subsequently, a much lower proportion of the
existing stock has minimum standards of energy effi-
ciency. There is an intention to increase minimum
energy standards over time and they were revised
upwards in 2010 (ABCB, 2010).
Alongside the mandatory minimum standards, the
Australian commercial office and retail property
market is characterized by the National Australian
Table 1 Case studies on green leases
Country Case
number
Description Sources
UK 1 Document analysis of leases for17 ‘BREEAM’ (BuildingResearch
Establishment Environmental AssessmentMethodology)-rated
o⁄ce buildings and nine (mostly BREEAM-rated) retail premises.
Bright andDixie (2014)
2 Twenty interviews of retail property participants; document analysis of
company reports andmodel lease clauses.
Ongoing WICKED
research project
3 Marks and Spencer (M&S) green lease andmemorandum of
understanding (MoU) experience to date (MoUs in 65 existing
stores; green leases in 80new stores).Methods: document analysis,
interviews withM&S sta¡.
Janda et al. (2015)
Australia 4 Document analysis of leases for 500 plus o⁄ce buildings in Sydney
Central BusinessDistrict.
Dawson et al. (2014)
5 Interviews with Sydney Better BuildingsPartnership (BBP) and
personal communicationwithAustralian property lawyer(s) on o⁄ce
and retail leasing practices.
Ongoing WICKED
research project
The evolution of green leases
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Built EnvironmentRating (NABERS) system,whichhas
tools for energy andwater ratings. In 2010The Building
Energy Efficiency Disclosure Act established the Com-
mercial Building Disclosure Program, which requires
energy efficiency information to be providedwhen com-
mercial office space of 2000 m2 or more is offered for
sale or lease (Australian Government, 2015). These
standards are performance ratings (similar DECs in
the UK) and are made public in the form of Building
Energy Efficiency Certificates (BEECs). The goal is to
improve the energy efficiency of Australia’s office
stock, and also to inform buyers and tenants. The
rationale is that buyers and tenants can easily ascertain
the level of energy efficiency and many will choose
buildings with better standards that align with their
leasing practices and/or corporate social responsibility
policy. The voluntary Green Star environmental rating
tool also sets energy standards that increase in line
with the different star ratings. In comparison with the
UK (discussed above), Australia has less aggressive
CO2 reduction targets. Whereas European Union
countries plan to reduce GHG emissions between
2020 and 2030 by approximately 2.8% per annum,
the World Resources Institute estimates that Australia
lags behind with a planned 1.8% per annum reduction
rate (Gerholdt & Ge, 2015).
Green lease context: UK andAustralia
In Australia, the Australian commonwealth and state
governments have provided important early leadership
for green leases. Under the Energy Efficiency in Gov-
ernment Operations (EEGO), policy standards have
been set since 2006 for all new government leases of
more than 2000 m2 through the use of a ‘Green
Lease Schedule’ (GLS) (Woodford, 2007).
In addition, in both the UK and Australia, industry lea-
dership has been crucial to the emergence of greener
leasing. The UK Better Buildings Partnership (BBP)
and the Sydney BBP were established (in 2007 and
2011 respectively) to work collaboratively with
leading landlords ‘to develop solutions to improve
the sustainability of existing commercial building
stock and achieve substantial CO2 savings’ (UK BBP,
2015a). UK BBP members include ‘the UK’s leading
commercial property owners’ (UK BBP, 2015a);
Sydney BBP members include ‘a number of Sydney’s
leading commercial and public sector landlords’
(Sydney BBP, 2015). Both BBPs developed toolkits pro-
viding a menu of ‘green clauses’ (Sydney BBP, 2013;
UK BBP, 2013a) that parties can elect to include in
leases and that provide a framework ‘for sustainable
operations and collaboration throughout the life of
commercial leases right from the on-set’ (Sydney
BBP, 2013)
In addition to green leases, the UK BBP has also pro-
moted memoranda of understanding (MoUs) (UK
BBP, 2013a, p. 2). MoUs are separate written agree-
ments that capture the intentions between negotiating
parties and can be used in conjunction with binding
agreements (such as leases). In leasing, MoUs provide
a flexible mechanism for enabling collaboration for
buildings already let, as they are not legally binding,
can be entered into at any stage of the lease and can
be updated without amending the lease. By contrast,
in Australia, MoUs have not been widely used due to
the costs of negotiation and non-binding nature.
Beyond the UK and Sydney BBPs and their members,
the Global Real Estate Sustainability Benchmark
(GRESB), established in 2009, is an industry-driven
assessment that reports annually on the sustainability
performance of real estate portfolios around the
world (GRESB, 2015). The GRESB survey includes a
section on stakeholder and tenant engagement, part
of which focuses on the use of green leases and
MoUs (Shire & Quispel, 2013).
Case studies: evidence of green leases and
leasing
Within the broader context of the markets outlined
above, this section discusses a diverse set of case
studies in the UK and Australia. In the UK, Case 1 pre-
sents a small-scale review of leases in ‘green’ UK office
and retail buildings; Case 2 presents initial findings
from the ongoing WICKED research project theme on
‘green leasing’ practices in the UK retail sector; and
Case 3 highlights in more detail the ‘green lease’ prac-
tices of one of the WICKED project participants, a
leading UK retailer. In Australia, Case 4 describes a
large-scale study carried out by the Sydney BBP into
Sydney’s commercial office leasing market; and Case 5
provides a brief qualitative assessment of the use of
green leases in Australia’s retail market.
Case1: UKo⁄ce and retail
Using a qualitative document analysis approach,
Bright and Dixie (2014) examined the content of 26
UK commercial leases (17 office and nine retail) in
detail to develop a categorization of ‘green clauses’.
The sampling aimed for a mix of locations, landlords
and tenants, but most of the leases involved
BREEAM-rated properties and were available on the
public land register (compulsory for leases more than
seven years). Some additional leases were selected by
identifying parties with public green commitments
(including green lease policies). Sampling was also
restricted to leases registered in 2008 or later as
green leasing has only emerged since then. This
sample group was acknowledged as unrepresentative
and was selected in order to increase the chance of
identifying green leases within such a relatively small
sample.
Janda et al.
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Bright and Dixie (2014, p. 10) define ‘green clauses’ as
those that are ‘designed to facilitate the property being
used in a resource efficient manner and which [ . . .
take] account of energy efficiency and other sustain-
ability goals and measures’. The authors grouped
clauses into 10 categories, such as: producing a sustain-
ability statement or environmental plan; sharing data
about energy, water or waste consumption; permitting
the landlord to conduct maintenance and other services
in an environmentally sensitive manner; and enabling
one or both parties (usually the landlord) to make
resource efficiency improvements.
In this dataset, despite being deliberately skewed
toward green buildings, the authors found that about
40% of the sample (11 leases, five office and six
retail) had no discernible green clauses.
Fifteen leases (12 office and three retail) contained one
or more green clauses, and these varied significantly in
their content, scope and legal commitment. Within the
green leases, data-sharing was the most common clause
(80%), followed by a clause requiring environmental
considerations to be factored into alterations and/or
repairs (10/15 leases), and those allowing service pro-
vision to take account of environmental considerations
(10/15 leases).
Based on their analysis of these leases, Bright and Dixie
(2014, p. 19) conclude that the ‘flip-side of our findings
is that long-term leases are still being entered into for
green buildings which pay no attention to environ-
mental issues’, and there is ‘unlikely to be significant
penetration of green lease principles outside green
buildings’.
Case 2:WICKED retail research
The WICKED research project investigates energy
management strategies in the UK retail sector. In this
context, one research theme explores the role of
leases and other organizational practices. To date,
the researchers have conducted interviews with 20
representatives from 17 different organizations: four
property owners (landlords), four retail tenants, four
letting and property management companies, four
law firms, and one industry organization (the UK
BBP). Interviews are supplemented by document analy-
sis of company strategy reports, green lease clauses in
company templates and model green lease clauses pro-
moted by industry partnerships (e.g., UK BBP, 2013a).
A number of key findings are emerging. First, interview
responses suggest that the uptake of green leasing
arrangements in the retail sector remains low, whilst
green lease clauses appear more common in the office
sector. Green leasing is more likely to be adopted by
larger companies (in particular, the BBP members)
with public environmental commitments and/or
concern over exposure to environmental regulation,
and typically for prime properties. Lawyers for organ-
izations outside this select group of large landlords
may have heard of green leases but seldom see green
clauses in contracts.
Where green leases are adopted, agreed clauses are
typically either (1) quite broad, non-prescriptive and/
or non-binding (e.g., provisions that state a general
commitment to cooperate to improve environmental
performance); or (2) driven by specific regulatory
requirements (e.g., clauses dealing with the costs of
CRC compliance or the production of EPCs). MEES,
BREEAM and GRESB have all been highlighted as
drivers for reviewing lease clauses and green lease
discussions.
Despite the global interest in green leases in some
circles, an interviewee expressed a commonly held
view: that leases largely ‘sit in a cupboard for the
length of the tenancy’, except for ‘key intervention
points’ such as alterations or upgrades, when parties
(or more probably asset managers) will refer to the
formal lease wording (Interview #12).
Although lease clauses, including green ones, appear to
have little relevance to day-to-day operations, early
adopters point to potential benefits of the process of
negotiating green clauses as a platform for discussion
between landlords and tenants. The material goal of
green leasing is tenant and landlord cooperation
around energy and environmental management; a
green lease is a piece of paper that symbolizes and sup-
ports this effort.
Case 3:WICKED retail researchwithM&S
Drawing on early evidence from theWICKED research
project, a case study of Marks and Spencer (M&S) – a
UK-based retailer with an international chain of cloth-
ing and food shops – illustrates the leadership role that
M&S, the UK BBP and the UK BBP landlords are
playing in the roll out of green leases in the UK retail
sector. The case study is based on (1) interviews of
key M&S staff (over the phone and via e-mail, includ-
ing the head of Property Plan A, Plan A project man-
agers and an M&S property lawyer); and (2) analysis
of public documents and internal M&S documents
(e.g., strategy documents and standard lease clauses).
In 2012 M&S announced an ‘environmental leasehold
policy’ – to introduce green clauses through MoUs for
existing stores and to include green clauses in new
leases – a commitment now incorporated into M&S
Plan A 2020 (M&S, 2015, p. 21). The M&S story
suggests that strong leadership and concern about
climate change are important drivers for the environ-
mental plans that fed into this leasing policy (Vernon,
2007). Plan A, launched in January 2007, sets out
The evolution of green leases
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100 commitments to help M&S become ‘the world’s
most sustainable retailer’ (M&S, 2015) and is an
important part of its brand. The leasing policy
emerged from a convergence of drivers: that leases
should not undermine Plan A; a desire to control the
lease drafting process to create more standardization
across the M&S portfolio; an opportunity to save
costs through enabling building improvements; and
the promotion of green leases by the UK BBP.
Working together, M&S and UK BBP launched an
initiative to introduce green MoUs for 70 M&S
stores already under lease with BBP landlords (UK
BBP, 2013b). This ‘buy in’ from BBP landlords has
meant that the scope of the M&S MoU clauses
(broadly based on the BBP green lease toolkit (UK
BBP, 2013a)) is broader and more ambitious than the
green clauses being used in new M&S leases. Green
MoUs with UK BBP landlords have now been intro-
duced for 65 existing stores.
By contrast, for new leases M&S has to negotiate with
a much greater diversity of landlords. M&S has devel-
oped a standard set of green clauses, informed by the
BBP ‘Green lease toolkit’ (UK BBP, 2013a), with
overall a more limited scope than the MoUs. The
green clauses include a general commitment to carry
out lease obligations with a view to promoting environ-
mental good practice, an agreement to cooperate and
use reasonable endeavours to agree and comply with
an energy management plan, and an agreement to
maintain and share data. Between January 2013 and
December 2014 M&S entered around 80 new leases.
Early indications are that most of these, other than
lease renewals, include green clauses.
Prior to the development of the standard MoU and
green lease clauses, M&S reported that ‘darker green’
clauses (e.g., allowing increases in service charges
related to upgrades) were resisted by landlords. Also,
the existence of green clauses has provided a framework
and incentive for M&S’s Plan A project manager to
engage with landlords, meeting with them to discuss
priorities for cooperation ‘under the guise of green
leases’ (Plan A project manager, 12 January 2015).
M&S’s experience suggests that the ‘light green’
clauses based on the BBP toolkit have proved largely
uncontroversial in negotiations, possibly because of
the role of BBP in influencing standard industry prac-
tice and also M&S’s position in the market, where its
brand and size add value to landlords’ premises. This
shows the sideways impact of a large powerful tenant
as a ‘middle actor’ in the property market.
Case 4: Sydneyo⁄ce leasing
In December 2014, the Sydney BBP published the ‘BBP
Leasing Index,’ covering office leasing in Sydney’s CBD
(Dawson, Bailey, & Thomas, 2014). This index shows
clear evidence of green lease transformation in this
market. Whereas in 2009 only 15% all leases signed
in Sydney CBD had green clauses, by 2013 over 60%
of all leases included green clauses.
The BBP analysed leases from the public register in
New South Wales (Thomas & Dawson, 2014), using
the Sydney BBP’s Model Lease Clauses to define
‘green’ terms (Sydney BBP, 2013). Of the 7000 com-
mercial office leases in Sydney CBD, approximately
500 were sampled randomly depending on size of
tenancy (small, medium and large) and building
quality (non-prime and prime grades), with a target
sample size of 100 for each segment. Leases were ana-
lysed for the presence of one of 22 model lease clauses
and a grading system calculated a ‘model lease score’.
Gradings were based on ‘clause breadth’ (the number
out of the 22 possible) and ‘strength’ (how binding
the clause is, depending on whether dispute resolution
process would be triggered by breach). Numerical
grades were awarded and averaged to a total model
lease score (Thomas & Dawson, 2014).
There was a quadrupling of some form of green leasing
between 2008 and 2014, and 27% of the BBP model
lease clauses appeared in standard commercial office
leases. In prime buildings, over 80% of leases have
best-practice leasing in 2013/14, and include 44% of
the model lease clauses. Clauses relating to
cooperation, management and recycling, waste and
consumption were most frequently included. Nearly
one-quarter of leases included a clause relating to
securing or maintaining an NABERS rating. The next
most common clauses relate to information sharing,
environmental sustainability (a high-level commitment
clause) and waste reduction.
Despite this growth in the numbers of green clauses
used, clause strength still lags, indicating that parties
agree to collaborative frameworks but hesitate to risk
dispute resolution.
This study highlights the importance of landlord and
intermediary leadership in green leasing, following
the initial government-as-tenant introduction of the
GLS. It shows the sideways impact that major land-
lords have had on standard leasing practices, particu-
larly in prime buildings. Together with the Sydney
BBP, major Australian landlords have successfully dif-
fused a new form of governance of the landlord–tenant
relationship and environmental practices into the
Sydney office market.
Case 5: Australian retail market
Despite the evident adoption of green leases in office
properties, qualitative assessments suggest that green
leasing is unusual in Australian retail markets. The
Janda et al.
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Sydney BBP is initiating conversations with retailers
but reports that there has been no significant greening
of retail leases to date. Although further study is
needed, it appears this may be partly due to the
strong consumer orientation of state retail legislation
and the fact that the retail sector is so highly price sen-
sitive and cost conscious (Professor W. D. Duncan,
personal communication, 4 December 2014).
Further, in most Australian jurisdictions the cost of
capital improvements is not permitted to be passed
on to retail tenants as outgoings, although large retail
shops are generally excluded from this (Duncan &
Christensen, 2014).
Synthesis and discussion
Across the policy and property contexts of the UK and
Australia and the five cases presented, this section syn-
thesizes and discusses with reference to the literature
(1) what a green lease is and does; (2) who tends to
use green leases; and (3) where green leases are
present and absent in the market.
What a ‘green lease’ is and does: potential versus
reality
Although there are various sets of green model clauses,
there is still no international standard definition of
what a ‘green lease’ should be or do. How many
clauses and of what kind does a lease need to contain
to qualify as ‘green’? The Sydney BBP (Case 4)
reviewed a large number of green leases and con-
structed a strong case for green lease market trans-
formation, but even in this study a ‘green lease’ can
contain anything from a single ‘light green’ clause
(e.g., a very general duty to cooperate on environ-
mental matters) to a number of more ambitious ‘dark
green’ clauses (e.g., setting specific environmental
rating targets).
A comparison of the UK and Sydney BBP precedent
model clauses, as well as green clauses used in Cases
1 and 3, suggests certain core green clauses, typically
less ambitious, are promoted through the model
clauses and commonly found in agreed leases. These
include a general commitment to improve the environ-
mental performance of properties and commitments to
cooperate, in particular to share data about environ-
mental performance. The model clauses also all
contain similar provisions restricting tenant’s rights
to make alterations that adversely affect environmental
performance, and various provisions to enable the pro-
duction of energy performance certificates and other
ratings (BREEAM in the UK, NABERS and Green
Star in Australia). At the same time, the models also
contain a number of important differences. In particu-
lar, only the Sydney BBP model clauses include the
more ambitious provision – arguably key for
addressing the ‘split incentive’ issue – for the landlord
to make environmental improvements and recover the
cost through service charges. Such ambitious clauses
are very rare in the UK, and also meet with firm resist-
ance in Australia although they are successfully nego-
tiated in some leases (Roussac & Bright, 2012). In
relation to rent review, the UK BBP requires tenant
works to be disregarded but allows landlord works
to be taken into account, whilst the Sydney BBP
allows NABERS ratings achieved by either party to
be taken into account.
In both Australia and the UK, the case studies also
show that lease clauses operate at different levels of
enforceability. Although lease clauses are, prima
facie, binding, some lease clauses are intentionally
expressed not to be legally binding. For example,
Case 1 found that most (but not all) clauses agreeing
to agree an environmental plan were ‘good faith’ obli-
gations and not legally binding. MoUs are likewise
non-binding as a matter of law, although in Case 1
there was, exceptionally, reference to a legally
binding MoU that would also bind successors. Case 4
shows that binding clauses with ‘teeth’ – that attach
clear remedial consequences to breach – are relatively
unusual, and this was also true of leases in Case 1.
Even if binding, many ‘green’ clauses may be difficult to
enforce. Duties to exercise ‘reasonable endeavours’ and
to ‘cooperate’, lack specificity and it will be hard to
prove breach. Additionally, it is unclear whether a
promise to ‘cooperate’ or exercise ‘reasonable endea-
vours’ is enforceable as amatter of English contract law.
Interviewees in the WICKED research project (Case 2)
commented that parties are unlikely to seek legal enfor-
cement. Indeed, it is not unusual for lease clauses not to
be enforced. For example, at the termination of the
lease, a Schedule of Dilapidation in the UK, or Make
Good in Australia, will be drawn up by the landlord’s
surveyor, who identifies all repairs that should have
been attended to by the tenant(s). Although there is
an opportunity to enforce the lease terms, in practice
enforcement is dependent on other variables and
tenants may be able to walk away without undertaking
many of the items agreed to in the lease (Rowling,
2012).
The case studies show ‘green leases’ in practice to
contain awide varietyof ambitions and levels of enforce-
ment. Despite the potential strength of private–private
contracts (Vandenbergh, 2005) and the existing role of
leases as a ‘local law’ between two parties, the relatively
low level of ambition and enforceability of agreed green
leases suggests they have may have more symbolic value
than measurable material impact. As a tool for inter-
organizational governance, green leases as currently
configured have much in common with VEPs, whose
impacts are also difficult to quantify (Borck &
The evolution of green leases
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Coglianese, 2009). However, interviews with early
adopters of green leases (Cases 2 and 3) suggest they
facilitate useful conversations about cooperation
between tenant and landlord on environmental matters.
Whoadopts and uses green leases?
The organizations adopting green leases in the UK and
Australia are mainly the same type that are likely to
participate in other forms of VEPs: large powerful
organizations with sustainability goals, in markets
that are facing regulation (Borck & Coglianese,
2009). Corporate responsibility also acts as a major
driver for these organizations (Dixon et al., 2009;
Newell, 2008).
More specifically, across the UK and Australia, green
leases are generally led by the landlord. Almost invari-
ably the landlord’s lawyer supplies the draft lease for
negotiation. This means that it is usually the landlord’s
environmental management style that will lead the use
of green leases.
There are some exceptions: the Australian government
has been an important leader through the required use
of the GLS when an Australian government office lease
is signed. Case 3 shows M&S as a retail tenant imple-
menting green leasing. What unites these exceptions is
the strong market strength of these tenants and their
institutional policy commitment to environmental
good practices and social responsibility.
The case studies uphold the idea of landlords as middle
actors (Janda & Parag, 2013; Parag & Janda, 2014),
capable of exerting influence on others. They play
this role both sideways (e.g., landlords learning from
other landlords, through the mechanism of the BBPs)
and downstream (imposing new leasing practices on
tenants). In the UK, data from the case studies
suggest that only M&S seems to be playing a ‘middle
actor’ role as a private tenant, particularly in the
retail sector. In the UK, the impetus for green leases
clearly comes from middle actors in industry (mostly
landlords) rather than from the top down. The Austra-
lian government requires green leases in its rented
offices; the UK government does not.
From a ‘middle-out’ perspective, the ‘sideways’ and
‘downstream’ implications of these findings are that
green leases may not be an ideal indicator of ‘tenant
engagement’ (e.g., as articulated in and measured by
GRESB (GRESB, 2015; Shire & Quispel, 2013).
Engagement should be a two-way process, with the
tenant and landlord working together. However, if
landlords are the more powerful shapers of the ‘local
law’ set by the lease, the nature of the power structure
may suggest ‘cooptation’ (the formalized inclusion of
challengers into the authority system that they are chal-
lenging (Coy, 2013)) rather than a more equitable
consensus-driven process of ‘cooperation’ and
engagement.
Where are green leases present and absent?
Although green leases are applicable in concept to any
rented property, large or small, their diffusion across
the market is uneven. The case studies in both the
UK and Australia show that green leasing is more
prevalent in offices than in the retail sector. Within
the office market, the trend seems concentrated in par-
ticular geographic locations (e.g., CBDs of major
cities). Most of the activity (and research to date) is
concentrated in London and Sydney, yet there are
important property markets in both the UK and Aus-
tralia outside these cities. Case 4 also marks a differ-
ence in green lease uptake between prime properties
(about 80%, representing about half the CBD in
Sydney) and sub-prime properties (60% uptake, repre-
senting the rest of the tenanted space). Given the evi-
dence available, wider uptake in non-prime
properties or amongst smaller landlords and tenants
seems unlikely. A ‘green lease’ might be thought of in
the context of letting a modern building designed to
high environmental standards, but arguably the need
for green leases is even stronger for buildings in the sec-
ondary and tertiary markets that have poor environ-
mental credentials.
The case study data to date cannot say why green leases
are more widely adopted in the office market than in
the retail market. This uneven uptake, however,
suggests that the relationship between property and
organizational decisions is complex and worthy of
study, as Axon et al. (2012) and Edwards and Ellison
(2004) suggest.
Conclusions and implications for
governance
This paper has argued that green leasing can be concep-
tualized as a new form of ‘middle-out’ energy and
environmental governance at the property level. It
has described the evolution of greener leasing practices
drawing on case studies across different countries and
sectors. It has highlighted evidence of the uptake of
green lease clauses, drivers for this uptake, their
content and potential implications for inter-organiz-
ational governance. With the exception of the Austra-
lian government GLS, there is no government-directed
use of green leases. Most green leases or MoUs there-
fore are ‘voluntary’ in the sense that the green clauses
are additional to the terms ordinarily used within
leases and, more generally, go beyond environmental
compliance. However, they could be legally enforce-
able, which most other VEPs are not. Top-down regu-
lation provides a backdrop to green leases, but the role
of landlords and industry groups, particularly the
Janda et al.
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BBPs, have been important ‘middle-out’ influencers.
Early adopters of green leases are a mixed group of
large organizations, mainly landlord led but with
some notable tenant exceptions.
From a larger governance perspective, it is unlikely that
green leases are well suited to top-down government-
led initiatives such as building regulations or tax incen-
tives (Qian, Fan, & Chan, forthcoming; Zhang et al.,
forthcoming). Green leases could be made mandatory,
but the fact that lease wording is tailored to particular
contexts would mean that any mandated clauses would
necessarily be broad. Furthermore, monitoring compli-
ance would be difficult given that in the UK, for
example, the Land Registry only requires registration
of leases that are more than seven years long, so the
government itself does not have a complete record of
who is leasing what or how these leases are worded.
While green leases may be difficult for the regulatory
state to embrace, they are an ideal tool for non-state
actors, particularly organizations with multiple prop-
erties. They can be made mandatory within a portfolio,
such as the Australian government requiring them for
their rented offices and M&S requiring them for their
rented stores. Insofar as ‘governance’ is not the same
as ‘government’ (Janda & Kwak, 2011), these require-
ments are mandatory, but imposed by one organiz-
ation upon another rather than by the state across its
domain. Considering green leases as a new form of
private–private environmental governance could lead
to new ways of applying ideas about polycentric gov-
ernance (Ostrom, 2010) to shared spaces as well as
to shared resources.
Polycentric governance is often associated with the
management of shared environmental resources in a
contiguous space, such as a metropolitan area, a
fishery or a forest. This paper has suggested that
green leases currently manifest mainly in large multi-
site organizations that own or rent spatially distributed
spaces, what Axon et al. (2012) call ‘fleet’ landlords
and tenants. How would or do green leases operate
as a form of environmental management in a contigu-
ous area, such as a city?
The Tokyo Metropolitan Government and C40 Cities
recently surveyed 12 different kinds of energy effi-
ciency initiatives, including green leases, in 16 cities
across nine countries (Takagi et al., 2015). This
report found programmes promoting green leases in
15 of the 16 studied cities (Takagi et al., 2015,
p. 21). Of the 15 cities promoting green leases,
however, two-thirds of the programmes (10 cities)
were designated as ‘partner-led’, a category the
authors use ‘only when no city-led or higher-tier gov-
ernment-led programmes were found’ (p 21). Across
a matrix of 12 different types of policy elements, the
promotion of green leases was the only category
where partner-led programmes figured prominently
in the analysis.1 At the city level, these findings
support this paper’s conclusions that leasing is a mech-
anism currently led by private entities rather than
public ones. As Dixon, Britnell, and Watson (2014)
suggest in their study of urban retrofit practices, the
commercial property sector may be ‘city blind’,
seeing opportunities for property retrofits in a portfolio
that extends across cities rather than fitting neatly
within their footprint. Such widely distributed activi-
ties challenge the utility of green leases as a policy
mechanism for city, regional and national govern-
ments. If the geographical level of the policy fits the
organizational structure of the industry, however,
green leases may be a fitting tool. For example, green
leases may be particularly useful in places like Singa-
pore and Tokyo, where strong governments coincide
with highly concentrated commercial property activi-
ties (Chua, 2014; Nishida &Hua, 2011, forthcoming).
As currently implemented, green leasing is a tool used
by businesses, generally with minimal government
involvement at the city, regional or national level. In
their review of VEPs, Borck and Coglianese (2009)
present a typology of three different kinds of VEPs –
unilateral, bilateral and public voluntary – depending
on the number of participating businesses and on the
degree of governmental involvement. Unilateral pro-
grammes are led by businesses or industry associations;
bilateral programmes are negotiated between govern-
ment and specific businesses; and governments use
public voluntary programmes to recognize achieve-
ments beyond mandatory standards. In this typology,
green leases are unilateral VEPs in the UK, but they
could be characterized as a bilateral VEP in Australia.
Governments in other countries could certainly follow
Australia’s lead and create bilateral programmes, using
their own purchasing power to promote the practice.
This action would likely only have positive impacts
in commercial property markets where government
tenancy plays a significant role.
From a legal perspective, leases are at the heart of gov-
ernance of tenanted space, but from an operational and
practical perspective they are less central. The people
who manage and occupy space may never see the
lease or even have access to it (Roussac & Bright,
2012). The evidence to date in the UK and Australia
suggests that green leases may provide a ‘necessary
but not sufficient’ function in tenanted commercial
property. Even without ‘teeth’, green leases encourage
inter-organizational negotiations in relation to energy
and environmental management. These developments
have not flowed directly from top-down governance,
VEPs or regulatory measures that are largely (with
the exception of MEES in the UK) blind to the joint
use of tenanted space. Green leases therefore add
a new tool to the box of regulatory and governance
tools that ‘operate concurrently or in overlapping
ways’ (Morgan & Yeung, 2007, p. 4) to address the
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‘wicked’ problem of improving the tenanted building
stock.
The further study of green leases and leasing could be
enhanced by the development of a tiered rating of
green leases that develops more nuanced processes
and thresholds for environmental ambitions, outcomes
and enforceability (e.g., light green, mid-green, dark
green), much like BREEAM and NABERS have for
green buildings. As much of the green lease work to
date is landlord led, genuine forms of tenant engage-
ment and even tenant leadership is another topic for
further study. The market may already be moving in
this direction. The UK BBP put ‘occupier engagement’
on its list of priorities (UK BBP, 2015b). The Sydney
BBP goes even further, conceptualizing the tenant–
landlord relationship as a kind of love match that can
lead to happiness (Blundell, 2013). Finally, further
quantitative and qualitative research through the
WICKED research project should generate firmer
insights into the role of green leases across the retail
sector as well as their impact on energy management
practices of tenants and landlords.
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Endnote
1For example, only two other policy categories noted the exist-
ence of partner-led programmes. Reporting and benchmarking
was partner-led in only one city; green building and energy
rating was partner-led in two cities. Green lease programmes
were partner-led in 10 cities.
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